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Tributes to scholars and their careers often testify to the honoree’s virtues.  A 
list of Josh’s virtues would include decent, kind, gentle, caring, conscientious, and 
generous, to name just a few.  Qualities like these spring immediately to mind 
when one reflects on Josh as a human being.  They’re also the qualities often 
mentioned when Josh’s name comes up in conversation (and he’s not around).  
Scholarly also comes to mind.  So too do modesty and humility.  Perhaps one way 
to respect Josh’s modesty and humility is to focus on just two of his many virtues, 
and in particular on the two virtues most prominently on display in his work as a 
scholar of the criminal law. 
My many encounters with Josh’s scholarship have heretofore been piecemeal, 
focusing on this or that article when guidance was needed on the law, or insight 
was needed on the theory, of this or that doctrine.  I’d never had occasion to study 
his work as a whole, looking for broader themes and connections running though 
contributions spanning nearly forty years.  The opportunity to reflect on Josh’s 
scholarly career gave me the perfect excuse to take the broad view, to try to see the 
forest.  Or, rather than excuse, should I say justification?  The question is apt, 
because the concepts of justification and excuse (especially excuse), and the 
difference between them, have long been central to Josh’s thought. 
On my reading, the two virtues most prominent in Josh’s scholarship are 
justice and compassion.  Josh is deeply committed to both.  Justice permits the 
state to punish only those who are worthy of blame and punishment.  Those 
unworthy of blame and punishment should be excused.  But those who are 
unexcused, and thus worthy of blame and punishment, need not be punished to the 
full extent justice allows.  For the justice to which Josh is committed, unlike the 
justice to which others are committed, doesn’t exclude the possibility of 
compassion and mercy.  On the contrary, the law should make as much room as 
possible for them.  Josh’s commitment to justice finds clear expression through his 
commitment to excuses, and to understand his theory of excuse, we should first 
attend to the distinction between excuses and justifications.1 
                                                                                                                                      
*   Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
1   Highlighting large themes comes at a cost.  Other themes get less attention than they 
deserve.  I have in mind Josh’s contributions to criminal procedure scholarship, especially his work 
on proportionality and capital punishment.  See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, The Jurisprudence of Death by 
Another: Accessories and Capital Punishment, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 17 (1979); Joshua Dressler, 
Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Proportionality and 
Justice as Endangered Doctrine, 34 SW. L.J. 1063 (1981); Joshua Dressler et al., Effect of Legal 
Education upon Perceptions of Crime Seriousness: A Response to Rummel v. Estelle, 28 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1247 (1982).  I also have in mind his work on omission liability.  See Joshua Dressler, Some 
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Criminal law theorists, and good criminal lawyers, nowadays routinely 
distinguish excuses from justifications.  Some defenses typically fall into one 
category, and others typically fall into the other category.  This now-commonplace 
distinction wasn’t always so common.  Of course, as Josh observed some thirty 
years ago, criminal dispositions did in the distant past turn on the distinction 
between justified and excused conduct.  The law treated you one way if you were 
justified, and another if you were excused.  Over time, however, a “successful 
claim of excuse . . . [came to have] the same direct effect as a justification: 
acquittal of the defendant.”2  He continued: 
 
Probably because of this, the interest of nineteenth and twentieth century 
lawyers and most legal scholars in the inherent differences between the 
two classes of exculpatory claims waned.  Indeed, until recently, the 
absence of interest in the subject was nearly complete.  American 
casebooks ignored the distinction; the topic received scant attention in 
American law journals; and treatise authors ignored the differences or, 
perhaps worse, suggested that the differences were of no concern to 
lawyers.  In light of this, it is not surprising that courts often use the 
words “justification” and “excuse” interchangeably.3 
 
That world is hard to imagine today.  Along with George Fletcher and others, 
including Paul Robinson, Josh pioneered the effort to reinvigorate attention to the 
distinction, and to help us see why it mattered.  If someone commits a crime under 
the conditions spelled out in a justification defense, like self-defense or necessity, 
then she was, all things considered, permitted to act as she did.  If someone 
commits a crime without justification, but under conditions spelled out in an 
excuse, then although she wasn’t permitted to act as she did, she’s nonetheless not 
                                                                                                                                                   
Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 
(2000). 
The most flagrant omission, however, is accomplice liability.  Josh’s 1985 article on complicity 
is a seminal contribution to the literature.  See Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical 
Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 
(1985).  Josh returned to complicity 23 years later.  See Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: 
Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427 (2008).  Three of Josh’s articles 
are especially conspicuous for combining in-depth historical and doctrinal analyses with theoretical 
insight.  The 1985 article on complicity is one.  The other two, on duress and provocation, are 
discussed below.  See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis on the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and 
Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989) [hereinafter Dressler, Exegesis on 
Duress], and Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982) [hereinafter Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion].  Each of 
these articles includes abundant citations to the relevant caselaw.  Few (if any) criminal law theorists 
writing today read and study the cases as Josh has, let alone with the same care. 
2   Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the 
Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1987) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Dressler, 
Justifications and Excuses]. 
3   Id.  
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to blame, and punishment would thus be unjust.  Thanks in large part to Josh’s 
early work, today’s casebooks (including his own)4 and treatises (including his 
own)5 now routinely divide defenses into justifications and excuses, and because 
the distinction is found in casebooks and treatises, one hopes they will increasingly 
come to be found in the arguments and pleadings of lawyers and in the opinions of 
judges. 
With the conceptual distinction between justification and excuses in view, 
Josh’s next step was to develop theories for them.  Under what conditions should 
the law allow someone to commit what would otherwise have been a punishable 
crime?  Under what conditions should the law withhold blame and punishment 
when someone, without justification, committed a crime?  Although Josh has 
ventured into both the theory of justification and the theory of excuse,6 his most 
concerted efforts have been dedicated to articulating and defending a theory of 
excuse.  Josh calls the theory of excuse he has developed, defended, and deployed 
over many years the personhood principle, or sometimes the choice theory. 
At the center of the personhood principle is an account of the person as a 
being capable of free choice.  If a person freely chooses (without justification) to 
commit a crime, he thereby becomes fairly liable to the reactive emotions.  He 
becomes worthy of blame and vulnerable to state punishment.  We rightly 
experience anger directed toward someone who freely chooses to commit a crime.  
Moreover, someone who freely chooses to commit a crime should experience 
anger directed toward himself.  Such anger is otherwise known as guilt.  A 
blameworthy choice is also a guilt-worthy choice.  Indeed, as Josh long ago 
observed: “[G]uilt feelings by wrongdoers are good.”7  Of course, blameworthiness 
and guilt don’t attach to all choices to do wrong.  They attach only to free choices.  
Those who make unfree choices should be excused for making them. 
The personhood principle describes the conditions under which a choice to 
commit a crime isn’t free, and thus under which a choice is free from blame.  The 
personhood principle is also part of a theory of justice: It would be unjust to punish 
someone who didn’t freely choose to commit the crime charged.8  The personhood 
                                                                                                                                      
4   Josh’s widely used casebook, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, first appeared in 
1994, and will soon appear in its eighth edition. 
5   JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (7th ed. 2015). 
6   His thoughts on the theory of justification are most fully developed in Joshua Dressler, New 
Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking 
and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 (1984), and Dressler, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 2, 
at 1163–65. 
7   Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the 
Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 689 (1988) [hereinafter Dressler, Reflections]. 
8   In his initial reflections on the theory of excuse, Josh detected a connection between the 
excuses and compassion.  Subsequent conversations with Herbert Morris “convinced [him] that 
excuses are about justice, not compassion.”  Joshua Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections on 
Excusing Criminal Wrongdoers, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 247, 252 (2009) [hereinafter Dressler, Some 
Very Modest Reflections]. 
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principle identifies two excusing conditions.  The first is lack of capacity (or 
substantial capacity).  The second is lack of fair opportunity.  The personhood 
principle thus states: A person who chooses to commit a crime should be excused 
if his choice is unfree, and his choice is unfree if he either lacked substantial 
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law; or if he had such 
capacity, he nonetheless lacked a fair opportunity to conform.9 
Josh has put the personhood principle—as a moral principle or principle of 
justice—to use in two ways.  First, he’s used it to identify the moral basis, or the 
most plausible moral basis, for existing legal defenses.  Which branch of the 
personhood principle best explains or rationalizes the law of this or that defense as 
we know it?  Second, having identified a defense’s moral basis, he’s used the 
principle to suggest reforms to the doctrine.  Because this or that defense is 
grounded in this or that branch of the personhood principle, it would better 
conform to the principle if we make this or that change to the doctrine.  The two 
defenses Josh has most often used the principle to illuminate and reformulate are 
duress and provocation. 
Duress is a familiar legal defense, but its moral basis is obscure.  When one 
person commits a crime against another in order to avoid a threatened harm at the 
                                                                                                                                      
9   This formulation of the personhood principle is truncated.  It states the principle only as it 
applies to a person’s capacity and fair opportunity to conform to the law.  Josh gives a complete 
statement of the principle as follows: 
Desert is based upon the principle that a specific blameworthy act can be imputed 
to the person . . . who is in court if, but only if, he had the capacity and fair opportunity to 
function in a uniquely human way, i.e., freely to choose whether to violate the 
moral/legal norms of society. 
“Free choice” exists if the actor has the substantial capacity and fair opportunity to: 
(1) understand the pertinent facts relating to his conduct; (2) appreciate that his conduct 
violates society’s moral or legal norms; and (3) conform his conduct to the law. 
Dressler, Reflections, supra note 7, at 701; see also Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections, supra 
note 8, at 253 (revisiting the topic in 2009 and “generally stand[ing] by what [he] wrote in 1988”). 
Josh identifies insanity as a defense based a person’s lack of substantial capacity to appreciate 
he’s committing a crime, or to conform his conduct to the law.  Insanity is thus an incapacity defense 
applicable to both (2) and (3).  Because Josh identifies insanity as an incapacity defense applicable to 
(3), he endorses volitional or control tests for insanity.  Other theorists reject such tests, limiting 
insanity to those who lack substantial capacity to appreciate they’re committing a crime.  Recently, 
Josh has voiced support for Judge Bazelon’s “justly responsible” test as a test for insanity.  See 
Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections, supra note 8, at 257.  His endorsement raises a question.  If 
Bazelon’s test were to become the sole test for insanity, would existing law reflect any defense based 
on an actor’s lack of capacity to appreciate or conform to the law? 
The relationship between the personhood principle and existing legal defenses raises another 
question.  As we’ll see, Josh has identified duress as an unfair-opportunity defense based on a 
person’s lack of a fair opportunity to (3) conform to the law, and as just mentioned, he has identified 
(at least until recently) insanity as an incapacity defense based on a person’s lack of capacity to (2) 
appreciate the law, or (3) conform to the law.  That leaves one piece missing.  What (if any) legal 
defense is based on a person’s lack of a fair opportunity to (2) appreciate the law?  The answer is 
reasonable mistake or ignorance of law, which Josh has long believed the law should recognize as a 
defense, despite the common law principle to the contrary.  See Dressler, Reflections, supra note 7, at 
707–08; Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections, supra note 8, at 253. 
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hands of a third party, liability is sometimes deflected in the name of duress.  
Again, why it should is obscure.  Some believe an actor who commits a crime 
under duress is permitted to commit it, which would make duress a justification.  
Not so, says Josh.  The law of duress, he’s long argued, fits the logic of excuse 
better than it does the logic of justification.  According to Josh’s theory of duress, 
which he first developed in 1985, duress should excuse when a defendant lacked a 
sufficiently fair opportunity to choose to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law, and an opportunity to choose to conform is sufficiently unfair if the choice 
he makes, albeit a choice to commit a crime, is nonetheless, under the 
circumstances, a choice that “attain[s] or reflect[s] society’s legitimate 
expectations of moral strength.”10 
Having identified duress’s moral basis, Josh has long urged lawmakers to 
make the legal defense more coextensive with the personhood principle.  For 
example, he argues that a defendant who kills another under serious threat should 
be permitted to have the jury at least consider a plea based on duress.11  Here, Josh 
disagrees with the common law, which bars duress as a defense to murder, but 
agrees with the Model Penal Code, which does not.  He likewise argues that the 
law should permit a defendant to submit a claim of duress to the jury when he 
commits a crime under a threat arising from force of circumstance, and not only 
from the agency of a third party.  Here, Josh disagrees with both the common law 
and the MPC, both of which bar what’s commonly known as “duress of 
circumstances” or “situational duress.”12 
Provocation is another familiar presence in the law.  Unlike duress, which is 
typically a full defense, provocation is a partial defense.  If a person intentionally 
                                                                                                                                      
10   Dressler, Exegesis on Duress, supra note 1, at 1334.  Quoting R.A. Duff, Josh offers an 
equivalent formulation: Would “a person with the kind of commitment to the values protected by the 
law (and violated by his action), and with the kind and degree of courage we can properly demand of 
citizens . . . have been thus affected by such a threat,” i.e., would such a person have committed the 
crime with which the defendant is charged?  Joshua Dressler, Duress, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 269, 286 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011) (quoting R.A.  
Duff, Rule Violations and Wrongdoings, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL 
PART 63, 64 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002) (emphasis added)) [hereinafter Dressler, 
Duress]. 
11  Dressler, Exegesis on Duress, supra note 1, at 1334, 1370–74; Dressler, Duress, supra note 
10, at 287–88. 
12  Dressler, Exegesis on Duress, supra note 1, at 1334, 1374–76; Dressler, Duress, supra note 
10, at 291–92.  Josh has long argued in favor of duress as the best doctrinal solution to cases 
involving battered spouses who kill their sleeping abusers.  See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Battered 
Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 457, 470 (2006); Joshua 
Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: Reflections on Maintaining Respect 
for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE 
GENERAL PART 259 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002).  He’s also argued it provides the 
best way to explain why Dudley and Stephens shouldn’t have been convicted for murdering Richard 
Parker.  See Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Dudley and Stephens and Killing the Innocent: Taking a 
Wrong Conceptual Path, in THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF 
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 126–27 (Dennis J. Baker & Jeremy Horder eds., 2013). 
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kills another in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation, he’s guilty at 
common law of manslaughter, whereas absent the provocation, he’d be guilty of 
murder.  The moral basis for the provocation doctrine is, compared to duress, 
probably even more obscure.  Once again, some believe a person is “partially 
permitted” to kill if he kills under the conditions defining provocation.  On this 
view, the provoked killer is guilty of manslaughter, not murder, because the 
provoked killer, compared to the unprovoked killer, is guilty of a lesser wrong, 
perhaps because his motives were more worthy (though not worthy enough for a 
full defense) or because the provocateur deserved to be punished for his 
provocation (though not with death and not at the hands of the defendant).  Either 
way, killing a provocateur isn’t as bad as killing someone who didn’t provoke a 
lethal response. 
Josh had long resisted this partial justification theory of provocation.  The 
doctrine of provocation, probably more than any other, has for Josh been a source 
of longstanding fascination.  His first article on provocation appeared thirty-five 
years ago, in 1982.  His latest, with three others in between, appeared in 2009.13  
The theory’s basic elements have remained more or less constant.  Provocation, 
according to Josh, is a partial excuse made available to someone who intentionally 
kills another when, as a result of adequate provocation,14 his capacity to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law is partially impaired, and his capacity to 
conform is partially impaired when his capacity to control his provocation-induced 
anger is partially impaired.  His capacity to control his conduct (and thereby 
conform to the law) isn’t completely undermined.15  The provoked killer still has 
some capacity for self-control, but not as much as he would have had without the 
provocation.16  Exercising and achieving self-control under the circumstances was 
hard, but not impossible. 
                                                                                                                                      
13  See Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 1, at 422–24 (initial statement of the 
theory); Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467 
(1988) (responding to Finbarr McAuley’s partial justification theory); Joshua Dressler, When 
“Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, 
and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995) (responding to 
Robert Mison’s utilitarian critique); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some 
Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 962 (2002) (responding to “the feminist 
argument for abolishing the defense”) [hereinafter Dressler, Why Keep Provocation?]; Joshua 
Dressler, Provocation: Explaining and Justifying the Defense in Partial Excuse, Loss of Self-Control 
Terms, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 319 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009). 
14  Josh initially believed the anger (or other emotion) in which the provoked killer killed must 
have been excusable (but inappropriate) anger.  In his later writing, Josh says he’s come to believe 
the anger in which the provoked killer kills can sometimes be understood as appropriate.  The 
defense should be available, however, as long as the accused’s anger is at least excusable.  See 
Dressler, Why Keep Provocation?, supra note 13, at 959, 972. 
15  Josh suggested in his first article on provocation that if a provoked killer’s capacity for self-
control was completely undermined, then he should be fully excused.  See Dressler, Rethinking Heat 
of Passion, supra note 1, at 465–66. 
16  Might provocation’s moral basis be found, not in the provoked killer’s partial incapacity to 
conform, but rather in his unfairly diminished opportunity to conform?  Josh has entertained this 
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Some progressive scholars abhor provocation.  The doctrine, as they see it, 
wrongly lets homophobes and misogynists get away with murder.  When a straight 
man kills a gay man who makes a non-violent sexual advance, or when a man kills 
a woman who is about to leave him, some formulations of the provocation doctrine 
would allow jurors to return a manslaughter verdict when the only verdict they 
should be permitted to return (according to the critics) is murder.  This progressive 
critique, as Josh understands it, is a consequentialist critique.  The provocation 
doctrine, according to the critics, causes more harm than good.  It devalues the 
lives of women and gay men, and leaves them inadequately protected.  Even if the 
defendant’s capacity for self-control was impaired, murder liability is the only way 
to properly value and adequately protect the lives of women and gay men. 
Josh is committed to progress, but he’s also committed to the personhood 
principle.17  If a man kills a woman or gay man because his capacity to conform to 
the law has, as a result of excusable anger, been partially impaired, he should be 
punished, but as a matter of justice, he should be punished less than he would have 
been had his capacity to conform been unimpaired.  For Josh, progress should not 
come at the cost of justice.  If all it takes to defeat an excuse is on-balance harm 
contingent on providing it, or on-balance good contingent on denying it, then no 
excuse will be safe.  If the excuses are grounded in a consequentialist calculus, 
then all the excuses, from duress to insanity, as well as provocation, would only be 
as secure as the shifting balance of consequences on which they rest.18 
The personhood principle forms a fixed point in Josh’s philosophy, but it 
comes with a counterpoint.  Josh is a compassionate man, and he’s long struggled 
to find a place in his philosophy for both justice and compassion.  Some might 
believe his struggle is bound to fail, because compassion expressed in action is 
mercy, and mercy just doesn’t mix with justice.  Indeed, mercy conflicts with 
justice.  It entails being unjustly lenient, and for some, too little punishment is just 
as unjust as too much.  Moreover, insofar as mercy occasions injustice, some 
believe it has no place in the criminal law.  The state’s only job, when it comes to 
punishing crimes, is to do justice.  It has no business being in the mercy business.  
Mercy is a virtue, but not one to which the state should aspire. 
                                                                                                                                                   
proposal, but ultimately remains unpersuaded.  See id. at 463–64; Dressler, Why Keep Provocation?, 
supra note 13, at 974 n.68. 
17  Few readers probably realize it, but Josh’s first article, published in 1978, condemned the 
law for allowing gay teachers to be routinely fired.  See Joshua Dressler, Gay Teachers: A 
Disesteemed Minority in an Overly Esteemed Profession, 9 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 399, 400 (1978).  
Josh would turn his attention again to gay rights in Joshua Dressler, Judicial Homophobia: Gay 
Rights Biggest Roadblock, CIV. LIB. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1979, at 19, and in Joshua Dressler, Survey of 
School Principals Regarding Alleged Homosexual Teachers in the Classroom: How Likely (Really) is 
Discharge?, 10 DAYTON L. REV. 599 (1985). 
18  See, e.g., Dressler, Why Keep Provocation?, supra note 13, at 966. 
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Josh thoughtfully rejects this skepticism.19  Mercy, he argues, has an 
important role to play in the criminal justice system.  The real question is where it 
should play that role.  The excuses, Josh has argued, are not the right place.  
Compassion and mercy should be able to find expression in the criminal law, but 
compassion can’t provide the moral basis for excuse.  On the contrary, if the 
criminal law were to embrace a theory of excuse based on compassion, Josh invites 
us to ask where it will lead.  Consider, for example, the brainwashed defendant, or 
the defendant born and raised in a rotten social background.  Josh has written about 
both.20  When a defendant is brainwashed, he’s coercively transformed from the 
person he was into the person who committed the crime.  Who wouldn’t feel 
compassion for him?  When a defendant comes from a rotten social background, 
his unjust environment shapes him into the person who committed the crime.  
Again, who wouldn’t feel compassion?  There but for the grace of God go I. 
No one understands these compassionate sentiments better than Josh.  
Nonetheless, compassion, he warns, can lead us astray.  When someone commits a 
crime, our compassion can often be elicited if we attend to the crime’s causes.  Of 
course, some causes may elicit compassion more readily than others.  We’re more 
apt to experience compassion for someone from a rotten social background than 
we are for someone from a spoiled rotten background.  Still, compassion, Josh 
observes, can slide into causation.  Compassion can lead us to embrace a theory of 
excuse based on causation; to wit: A choice should be excused if it was caused.  
Yet if determinism is true, all choices are caused, and if all caused choices are 
excused, then all choices are excused.  To understand all is to excuse all. 
No, excuses are rooted in justice, not compassion.  Compassion will need to 
find expression elsewhere.  Josh once thought compassion’s place was at 
sentencing.  Once a defendant’s conviction had been justly secured, once any claim 
of excuse had been justly denied, and once he thereby became vulnerable to state 
punishment, then, but only then, should compassion take the stage.  Judges should 
be allowed, or perhaps required, to consider a defendant’s plea for compassion.  
Facts like coercive indoctrination and rotten social backgrounds, which have no 
just bearing on guilt or innocence, should nonetheless be heard for mercy’s sake 
when the state decides how great a burden the defendant must bear for his crime.  
Thus, once upon a time, sentencing was the home Josh found for compassion and 
mercy. 
That was once upon a time, but times change.  The changing times have 
brought changes to how we sentence.  Judges once had discretion, which not only 
                                                                                                                                      
19  See Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be 
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1472 (1990) (“I think it is safe to say that most of us . . . want a 
penal system that allows for both justice and mercy.  And, since we cannot fully have both, we treat 
justice as the primary goal, but one which we are prepared to compromise in unusual circumstances 
out of compassion for the person who must suffer our justice.”). 
20  Joshua Dressler, Professor Delgado’s “Brainwashing” Defense: Courting a Determinist 
Legal System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 335 (1979) (brainwashing); Dressler, Exegesis on Duress, supra note 
1, at 1377–85 (rotten social background); Dressler, Duress, supra note 10, at 292–93 (same). 
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allowed them to do justice, but to temper justice with mercy.  Alas, the discretion 
needed for justice and mercy can all too easily become, in human hands, a vehicle 
for caprice and discrimination.  Believing judges had failed to use their discretion 
wisely, resulting in too much caprice and discrimination, lawmakers removed it.21  
Sentencing, which once depended on the practical wisdom of a judge, has 
increasingly come to depend on the numbers of a grid.  Of course, that’s an over-
generalization, but it makes the point.  Insofar as sentencing by the numbers has 
squeezed compassion and mercy from sentencing, can the law find for them a new 
home? 
Josh’s recent thoughts on this problem have led him back to the excuses.  The 
excuses in law tend to be all or nothing.  Either you’re excused, or you’re not.  Yet 
the excuses in morality are seldom all or nothing.  They’re usually a matter of 
more or less.  Sometimes they reduce blame without eliminating it.  Provocation, 
of course, is the most prominent example in law.  If sentencing no longer makes 
room for compassion and mercy, or if sentencing can make room for compassion 
and mercy only if caprice and discrimination come along, then perhaps, Josh has 
suggested, the best we can do is to tailor justice as closely as we can to the 
individual.  One way for the law to tailor justice would be to adopt two generic 
partial excuses, one based on diminished capacity, and the other based on 
diminished opportunity.  These new defenses, which Josh has endorsed,22 wouldn’t 
make the law of excuses merciful, but they might at least make it more just. 
When Josh wants to pay someone a high compliment, and especially when he 
wants to commend their character, he’s apt to call them a mensch.  The 
compliment is offered as a sign of respect and endearment.  Not knowing exactly 
what a mensch was, I looked it up.  A mensch, I learned, is a person of integrity 
and honor.  Integrity and honor require commitment.  A person of integrity is true 
to his commitments, even when it would be easier to be faithless.  A person of 
honor gains it because he lives up to his commitments.  Josh is committed to 
justice and compassion; he’s been true to, and lived up to, those twin commitments 
in his scholarly writing for forty years; and he’s urged us all to create a criminal 
law likewise committed to both.  He’s a real mensch. 
                                                                                                                                      
21  Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections, supra note 8, at 254; Joshua Dressler, The Wisdom 
and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 853, 856 (2005). 
22  Dressler, Some Very Modest Reflections, supra note 8, at 256 (“I advocate recognition of a 
diminished-rationality/diminished-opportunity verdict as another step in the right direction.”). 
